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Abstract
Estimates of the per-contact probability of transmission between farms of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza virus of H7N7
subtype during the 2003 epidemic in the Netherlands are important for the design of better control and biosecurity
strategies. We used standardized data collected during the epidemic and a model to extract data for untraced contacts
based on the daily number of infectious farms within a given distance of a susceptible farm. With these data, we used a
maximum likelihood estimation approach to estimate the transmission probabilities by the individual contact types, both
traced and untraced. The estimated conditional probabilities, conditional on the contact originating from an infectious farm,
of virus transmission were: 0.000057 per infectious farm within 1 km per day, 0.000413 per infectious farm between 1 and
3 km per day, 0.0000895 per infectious farm between 3 and 10 km per day, 0.0011 per crisis organisation contact, 0.0414
per feed delivery contact, 0.308 per egg transport contact, 0.133 per other-professional contact and, 0.246 per rendering
contact. We validate these outcomes against literature data on virus genetic sequences for outbreak farms. These estimates
can be used to inform further studies on the role that improved biosecurity between contacts and/or contact frequency
reduction can play in eliminating between-farm spread of the virus during future epidemics. The findings also highlight the
need to; 1) understand the routes underlying the infections without traced contacts and, 2) to review whether the contact-
tracing protocol is exhaustive in relation to all the farm’s day-to-day activities and practices.
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Introduction
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) is one of the OIE
listed poultry diseases. Several epidemics involving these viruses
have occurred world-wide since its first description in northern
Italy in 1878 [1,2]. Examples of epidemics with devastating socio-
economic consequences are the 1999 H7N1 epidemic in Italy [3]
and the 2003 H7N7 epidemic in the Netherlands [4,5].
Consequences of these epidemics include economic losses incurred
in implementing control strategies and reduction in exports as well
as a risk of spread to humans [6,7]. The HPAI (H7N7) 2003
epidemic in the Netherlands involved 255 flocks; the virus was
isolated in 241 of these flocks while the other 14 flocks were
serologically positive [4,5]. The majority of affected flocks were
located in either of two areas with high poultry farm densities: one
comparatively large area situated in the centre of the country, and
one smaller area in the south; for more details we refer to Boender
et al. [8].
Following the detection of the first outbreak, a control
programme, as stipulated by the European Union, was
implemented. This programme consisted of stamping out of
infected flocks, movement restrictions and establishment of
protection and surveillance zones. Despite additional control
measures such as pre-emptive culling of flocks within a radius of
1 km of an outbreak and establishment of buffer zones between
defined areas by complete depopulation of poultry flocks in
these zones, there was a continued spread of the virus by
mechanisms which are not clearly understood [5,8,9]. This
spread only came to an end after the control measures had led
to the culling of a large proportion of farms in the affected
regions [5]. For the farmers, this meant incurring economic
losses through and emotional burden of lost stock. Moreover,
after a debate accruing from the 2001 Foot-and-Mouth Disease
epidemic in the UK and the Netherlands, public opinion turned
against the (large-scale) preventive killing of healthy animals;
deeming it unethical [10,11]. Hence the Dutch government is
seeking alternative control measures to (large-scale) preventive
culling, with emergency vaccination being the preferred strategy.
However, in comparison with preventive culling, emergency
vaccination would have the important disadvantage that its
effect suffers from a 7 to 14 days protection delay [12]. This
delay would prolong the time until epidemic control is obtained
especially in the high density poultry areas (de Jong and
Hagenaars [13] and the references therein). Thus the identifi-
cation, testing and implementation of supplementary control
strategies such as improved biosecurity are required. Identifica-
tion of such strategies requires us to better understand the
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neighbourhood transmission (i.e., the indirect spread of the virus
to farms neighbouring an infectious farm) of the virus.
Plausible mechanisms include movements of humans (profes-
sional and non-professional visitors, employees and farmers
themselves), vehicular traffic (for example, delivery trucks), other
fomites (such as tools, cell phones and shared farm equipment) and
other vectors such as wind, rodents and insects [9,14–17]. These
transmission events involve transportation of the virus either in
contaminated litter, faeces or skin and feathers that can colloid on
the fomites or the vectors’ body. Therefore, in order to better
control neighbourhood transmission, we need to understand
deeper the steps involved in the whole virus dissemination process;
a quite complex task.
Following potentially infectious contacts i.e. exposures, the
probability of HPAI virus transmission may be contact-specific but
will also depend on the contact patterns: i.e., the frequency of
contacts and the contact network [18–20]. This interplay
illustrates the need to determine the probability of virus
transmission by a given type of contact during an epidemic. A
combination of the estimated probabilities and the information on
contact patterns can then be used to rank the individual contact
risks and to assess risks of spread between different densely
populated poultry areas. The resulting ranking is also important to
guide further research and biosecurity implementation.
During the Dutch HPAI epidemic in 2003, the National
Inspection Service for Livestock and Meat (RVV), responsible for
the implementation of animal disease legislation and eradication of
outbreaks of OIE listed diseases, was tasked with collecting
epidemiological data and tracing of upward and downward
contacts to and from infected farms. Using this data, Thomas and
co-workers [9] performed a risk factor analysis to establish the
factors that may have been responsible for the introduction of the
virus on each of the farms involved. They found an increased risk
of HPAI virus introduction in layer-finisher type poultry compared
to other poultry types. Their analysis gave some clues on the risk
factors for HPAI virus introduction such as poultry type and flock
size. However, it is also important to gain insight into the
transmission routes of the virus including the absolute risk of
infection for given types of indirect contact between farms, an
aspect addressed by the type of analysis we perform in this study.
Since contact frequency and the per-contact probability of virus
transmission partly determine the risk that a given category of
contacts poses, the results of this analysis may facilitate a risk
classification of these contacts. Such a classification is vital in the
design of improved biosecurity and possibly other control
strategies.
Our analysis aims to give quantitative insight into the role of the
different between-farm contacts in the spread of the virus during
an epidemic. We focus on the specific contacts that occurred
during the HPAI (H7N7) epidemic in the Netherlands and
estimate the probability of HPAI virus transmission attributable to
each type of contact. Using published genetic data obtained by
sequencing most of the samples collected during the epidemic
[21], we assessed the consistency of our estimates with the genetic
data. With these results, we provide scientific support to improve
biosecurity measures to prevent transmission.
Materials and Methods
Data
We used two sets of data collected during the Dutch 2003 HPAI
epidemic. One of the datasets was collected via a standardized
field epidemiology investigation form of the RVV [22]. It included
detailed information about day-to-day visits to all farms (infected
and non-infected) such as visits for deliveries of farm inputs and for
off-transport of outputs as well as professional and non-
professional visits. In compiling this particular data, a follow-up
to the visits mentioned by the farmers was made where possible.
The preliminary data were cross-checked in detail and completed
by the tracing unit of the crisis centre using the files obtained from
the poultry-related businesses involved. This dataset captured
information on a total of 614 visits originating from 203 infectious
farms. Out of these visits, 381 were to infected farms. The total
number of receiving farms was 325 of which 149 were ultimately
infected. The other dataset was entirely about the visits that
occurred in relation to measures aimed at controlling the epidemic
(crisis organisation contacts). These included visits for: screening
(i.e., the clinical inspection of poultry in the surveillance zone),
tracing (i.e., the follow-up of visits from infected farms), indexing
(i.e., the valuation of the flocks to be culled), and culling activities
by the RVV [16]. From this dataset we selected visits to a farm
that occurred up to seven days prior to and excluding its day of
suspicion. For these contacts, we only considered same-day visits
i.e., those that occurred on the same day that the person had
visited an infectious farm.
In both datasets we could also find HPAI-related details such as
the status and dates of clinical suspicion and stamping out for both
the infected source farm and receiving farms. Since we could not
identify a potentially infectious traced visit for all the ultimately
infected farms, we introduced a category of ‘unknown’ contacts
over different distance ranges. A farm was assigned one unknown
contact per day when it was in the vicinity of an infectious farm.
We chose three distance ranges (and hence three different
unknown contact types) namely, 0–1 km, 1–3 km and 3–10 km
of an infectious farm and assigned the unknown contacts
accordingly. Details of these and all the other visits are given in
Table 1.
For each farm (infected or not) in the dataset, we extracted (and
tabulated) all its exposures. In the summary table for the analysis,
we indicated, for each contacted farm, the type and number of
exposures as well as its ultimate status. A farm was deemed
exposed if the visit occurred during the period when the virus was
likely to have been introduced onto the receiving farm, here
referred to as the potential virus-introduction period. Due to the
uncertainty about the actual day of virus introduction, both the
potential virus-introduction and infectious periods were assumed
to begin seven days prior to the day of clinical suspicion,
corresponding to the estimated farm infectious periods during
the epidemic (i.e., 7.3 and 6.9 days for the two regions affected) for
the period after epidemic detection [5]. The potential virus-
introduction period lasted until the day before clinical suspicion
while the infectious period lasted up to seven days after stamping
out. This extended infectiousness was based on the hypothesis that
the stamping out did not immediately rid the entire farm and its
surroundings of all infectious material.
Data Analysis
If pi is the probability of infection per type {i exposure, then
the cumulative probability of a farm escaping infection Pescape
 
following a series of exposures is P
all i
1{pið ÞCi where Ci is the total
number of type {i exposures and the compliment (1{Pescape)
gives the probability of infection. In this case, we consider pi to be
the conditional probability of virus transmission per contact i.e.,
the probability that a given contact transmitted the virus given that
the contact occurred and that it originated from an infectious
farm.
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To estimate these probabilities, we used a maximum-likelihood
approach. The likelihood function was given by
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where i indexes the exposure-type, d indexes the day-number (days
before clinical suspicion day) that the contact occurred, Cinfi,d is the
number of type{i exposures to a case farm occurring d days before
clinical suspicion, Cesci is the total number of type{i exposures to a
non-case farm, wd is the ‘weighting factor’ representing the
probability that infection occurred through exposures occurring
on day d (see below), 1{ P
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P
d
wdC
Inf
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is the probability
of a farm being infected, 1{pið Þ
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is the probability
of a farm escaping infection by type {i exposures, and
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i
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is the probability of a farm escaping infection
throughout the epidemic.
In this analysis, we assumed that: 1) the ‘exposure’ period
started seven days prior to and lasted until the eve of clinical
suspicion, 2) the infectious period began seven days prior to the
day of clinical suspicion and lasted up to seven days after stamping
out, 3) the conditional probability of infection was fully dependent
on the contacts indicated in Table 1, and 4) the per-contact
probability of infection by the traced contacts is independent of the
distance between the source and receiving farms.
We used Mathematica 8 (Wolfram Research, Inc.) to perform
the maximisation procedure. The 95% Confidence Intervals (CI)
for the maximum likelihood estimates were computed using the
likelihood ratio test. We quantified the contribution of the different
contacts to the epidemic in terms of the number of new infections
that they may have caused. This was obtained by multiplying their
estimated per-contact probability with their frequency.
As an introduction can only occur on one day, we can only
allow for the uncertainty about when this day was by giving
weights to each of the possible introduction days with these
weights adding up to one. For the base model, we used a uniform
distribution to obtain wd~
1
7
. In other words, we assumed that
each of the seven days of the probable period of virus introduction
was equally likely to be the actual day of virus introduction.
However, we also checked the outcomes based on different
distributions in the sensitivity analysis.
Sensitivity and Bias Analyses
Sensitivity analysis. We performed a sensitivity analysis to
ascertain the effect, on the probability estimates, of the possible
uncertainty in defining the distribution underlying the actual day
of virus introduction over the assumed period. We performed this
analysis by re-running the calculation with different distributions
underlying the estimation of the weighting factor wd . We assessed
two other distributions in which the estimated weighting factors wd
were adjusted to sum to one over the 7-day period, namely; 1) a
distribution in which the probability is decreasing exponentially
over the 7-day period at a rate determined by the survival of HPAI
virus in manure (in this case 14 days [23]) and, 2) a unimodal
distribution with the most likely day being 4 days prior to the day
of clinical suspicion. In the second case, we used a discretized
normal distribution with a truncated domain and s~1 day. In
both cases the assumed distributions were normalised to sum to
one.
Potential difference in tracing efforts on case and non-
case farms. We hypothesized that, during the epidemic, the
tracing process may have been more rigorous on case farms
compared to the non-case farms. We explored the effect of this
possibility by considering a scenario where an under-representa-
tion of the contacts to the escaping farms – for example due to a
more lax attitude of the tracing teams when on non-case farms –
could have occurred. We estimated the maximum effect that this
would have on the estimated probabilities in the following 3 steps:
1) if we let Ptr be the tracing probability of a contact, this would be
Table 1. The description of the contacts extracted from the three datasets based on the assumed infectious and potential virus-
introduction periods of this study.
Type of contact Description
Feed delivery contact A truck delivers feed to an infectious farm and proceeds to a susceptible farm.
Egg transport contact A truck picks eggs or trays from an infectious farm and proceeds to a susceptible farm.
Rendering contact A routine pick up of dead animals (not related to culling) occurred on an infectious farm and
proceeds to a susceptible farm.
Other-professional contact* A person (for example; veterinarian, dealer, advisor, technicians, and ‘unspecified-others’) visits an
infectious farm and proceeds to a susceptible farm.
Crisis organisation contact Person-contact for epidemic control activities such as screening, tracing, indexing, and culling that
visited an infectious farm and proceeded to a susceptible farm.
Unknown contact:0–1 km** Contact assigned to farm for every day that it is within 1 km of an infectious farm.
Unknown contact:1–3 km** Contact assigned to farm for every day that it is between 1 and 3 km of an infectious farm.
Unknown contact:3–10 km** Contact assigned to farm for every day that it is between 3 and 10 km of an infectious farm.
*The variable is a combination of related traced variables.
**A farm was assigned one unknown contact per day that it was in the vicinity of an infectious farm within the indicated distance range.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040929.t001
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the exact probability of tracing a contact to a non-case farm if no
back-tracing at all was made at the non-case farm, 2) with back-
tracing in place for the case farms, the probability of tracing their
contact would be 1{ 1{Ptrð Þ2 and finally, 3) the maximum bias
due to under-representation occurs at the worst tracing level and
would be given by lim
Ptr?0
1{ 1{Ptrð Þ2
Ptr
 !
~2.
Validation Against Genetic Data
In order to validate the estimated per-contact probabilities, we
used the genetic data obtained by sequencing the majority of the
samples collected for outbreak farms during the epidemic [21]. In
this way, we used the genetic data to validate the estimated
probabilities per contact: too few or too many genetic matches
would cast doubt on the estimated probabilities. The approach
developed for this validation is described below and in the Text
S1.
With the contact inclusion criteria described under Data
section, we extracted traced contact pairs, i.e. farm pairs (A, B)
in which at least one contact originating from a then deemed
infectious farm A to a hitherto susceptible (but ultimately infected)
farm B, and occurring within the exposure period of farm B, was
traced. We then used the genetic information generated from the
majority of the samples taken from the affected farms during the
epidemic as reported by Bataille et al. [21] in Figure S2 of their
Supporting Information to identify which pairs had virus
sequences for both farms. For those pairs (i.e., with complete
genetic information), we compared their genetic sequences to
ascertain which ones were sufficiently ‘‘matching’’ for transmission
between A and B not to be unlikely. The number of genetically
matching pairs, minus an estimate of the expected number of ‘‘by-
chance’’ genetic matches, was then compared to the predicted
number of pairs (amongst those with complete genetic informa-
tion) in which virus transmission occurred (‘‘transmission
pairs’’) Npredicted
 
. This number was estimated from the overall
expected number by scaling it according to the expected
contribution of the 28 contacts, relative to that of the 56, based
on the estimated probabilities.
We considered four different (sets of) criteria for determining
whether a contact farm pair (A, B) represents a genetic match.
These (sets of) criteria differ in the level of genetic overlap required
between the sequences from farm A and farm B to qualify as a
genetic match. The most liberal criterion we considered was that
all mutations in the virus of farm A compared to farm 1 (i.e., the
first outbreak) were also found on farm B, i.e. when going from A
to B no mutations are lost. This criterion is necessary because it is
highly unlikely for the virus to lose mutations (i.e. undergo
backward mutation) between source and receiving farms. In the
other three, in addition to having no lost mutations, we permitted
only a specific number/range of additional mutations: allowing no
additional mutations at all, allowing #3 and, ƒ6 additional
mutations. For each criterion, we calculated an expected number
of transmission pairs by subtracting an estimate of the number of
‘chance matches’ from the total number of genetic matches (for
details see Text S1).
Results
With our selection criteria applied to the first dataset i.e., the
data from the epidemiological investigation by the RVV, we
were able to extract at least one traced exposure for 36 (i.e.
15%) ultimately infected farms and the number increased to 44
(i.e. 18%) upon including the crisis organisation contacts. With
the complete dataset (i.e., the latter two together with the
extracted unknown contacts), 227 (i.e. 94%) ultimately infected
farms had been exposed. Thus with all the available and
modelled data, all but 14 infected farms had either a traced
exposure or it was in the neighbourhood of an infectious farm
(unknown contacts).
In Table 1, we present a description of both the potentially
infectious contacts recorded during the HPAI (H7N7) epidemic in
the Netherlands in 2003 and the unknown contacts extracted for
purposes of this study. In Table 2, we present the extracted
number of contacts that met our inclusion criteria and their mean
estimates of the per-contact probability of virus transmission (and
their accompanying 95% CI). We also present in the same table
the percentage (and 95% CI) of infections potentially caused by
these contacts and the results of the sensitivity analysis.
Apart from the unknown and crisis organisation contacts,
feed deliveries had the lowest per-contact probability of virus
transmission of 0.0414 and potentially caused 2.63% of the new
case farms while the egg transports had the highest per-contact
probability of 0.308 and may have potentially caused 2.04% of
the new case farms. The probability of virus transmission per
crisis organisation contact was estimated to be 0.0011 and these
visits may have caused 0.13% of the new case farms. The
majority (92.54%) of the new cases were caused by the
Table 2. The number of contacts, the estimated per-contact transmission probabilities (95% CI), and the percentage of infections
caused for the potentially infectious contacts during the HPAI (H7N7) epidemic in the Netherlands in 2003.
Contact type
Total number of
contacts (to a case farm)
Per-contact probability
of infection (95% CI)
Percentage of
infections caused
(% of 227 cases)
Sensitivity analysis:
wd,exponential
decay function
Sensitivity analysis:
wd ,unimodal
distribution
Unknown contact:0–1 km 27700 (3048) 0.0000570 (0.00–0.00044) 0.70 (0.00–5.37) 0.0000449 0.0000586
Unknown contact: 1–3 km 190846 (25035) 0.000413 (0.00031–0.00052) 34.72 (26.06–43.72) 0.000414 0.000430
Unknown contact: 3–10 km 1466564 (171021) 0.0000895 (0.000076–0.00010) 57.82 (49.10–64.61) 0.0000908 0.0000913
Crisis organisation contact 272 (16) 0.00110 (0.00–0.012) 0.13 (0.00–1.44) 0.000 0.000
Feed delivery contact 144 (23) 0.0414 (0.0043–0.085) 2.63 (0.27–5.39) 0.0342 0.0261
Egg transport contact 15 (8) 0.308 (0.16–0.48) 2.04 (1.06–3.17) 0.305 0.303
Other-professional contact 16 (5) 0.133 (0.023–0.29) 0.94 (0.16–2.04) 0.130 0.000
Rendering contact 12 (4) 0.246 (0.10–0.43) 1.30 (0.53–2.27) 0.239 0.179
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040929.t002
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unknown contacts within the distance bands of 1–3 km and 3–
10 km.
Analysing the sensitivity of the estimated probabilities to the
assumed distribution underlying the actual day of virus introduc-
tion over the 7-day period, the outcomes from using the two
alternative distributions (i.e., one with an exponentially decreasing
probability and the other with unimodal distribution) were
compared with those of the default distribution (i.e., uniform
distribution). The estimates were very similar for most of the
exposure types. The only differences found, but these were small,
were in the per-contact probabilities for the crisis organisation
contacts for both alternative distributions and the other-profes-
sional contacts for only the unimodal distribution (see Table 2).
For both alternative distributions, the probabilities per crisis
organisation contact were within the 95% CI of the default
distribution whereas for the unimodal distribution, the per other-
professional contact probability reduced from 13.3% to 0.0%.
This reduction is a consequence of the very low weights wd
assigned by the unimodal distribution to the days on which these
contacts occurred. Three of the five contacts to ultimately infected
farms occurred seven days prior to the day of clinical suspicion
while the remaining two occurred four days and one day prior to
the day of clinical suspicion.
With respect to the effect of the potential difference in tracing
efforts on case and non-case farms – hence a possibility of under-
representation of the contacts to non-case farms, we found that,
with the worst tracing efforts, the contacts to case farms would be
twice as likely to be traced as those to non-case farms. This implies
that, at worst, the estimated probabilities could be double their
‘unbiased’ counterparts.
There were 56 traced contact pairs in which virus transmission
may have occurred i.e. contacts from an infected farm to a newly
infected farm. From the genetic data of the same outbreak [21],
complete genetic information was available for 28 of these pairs
(see Table S1). Using the estimated per-contact transmission
probabilities and the numbers of each contact-type, we estimated
that 15.96 outbreaks were explained by the traced contacts
(Table 2). After rescaling, we obtained the predicted number of
transmission pairs with matching genetic information Npredicted as
8.96. The lower and upper 95% confidence bounds of Npredicted
were estimated to be zero and 19 pairs respectively.
In Table S2, we present results of the pairwise genetic
comparison of the 28 pairs for our different criteria of defining a
genetic match. We observe (Table S2) that using the most strict
criterion of requiring a ‘perfect’ genetic match between contact
pairs (A, B) i.e., having no lost and no additional mutations when
going from A to B, we estimated that virus transmission may have
occurred in two pairs, reducing to 1.85 pairs upon subtracting the
expected number of chance matches. If we defined a contact pair
(A, B) to be a genetic match if there were no lost mutations when
going from A to B and permitting any number of additional
mutations, the number of transmission pairs was estimated to be
nine, reducing to 7.23 pairs when adjusted for chance matching.
Restricting the number of allowed additional mutations to ƒ6 or
to ƒ3 yields five matching pairs in both cases, reducing to 3.98
and 4.26 pairs respectively after subtracting the expected number
of chance matches. All these results are within the 95% confidence
bounds of the predicted number of transmission pairs with
matching genetic information and hence the observed and
predicted numbers are consistent.
Discussion
The mechanisms of HPAI virus spread between farms are
poorly understood; it has been hypothesized that the indirect
between-farm contacts play a role [9,14–17]. The frequency and
the transmission effectiveness of these contacts determine their
virus transmission rates. Here we perform a quantitative assess-
ment of the contribution of indirect contacts to the spread of the
virus between farms during the 2003 HPAI epidemic in the
Netherlands. During this epidemic, potentially infectious contacts
to both infected and escaping farms were traced. We use the
collected data to quantify the per-contact probability of virus
transmission between farms.
The estimated conditional probabilities of virus transmission are
presented in Table 2. In terms of per-contact risk, the estimates
reveal that egg transports have the highest risk with approximately
31% chance of transmission followed by the rendering visits with a
chance of transmission of 25%. The unknown contacts in the
distance band of 0–1 km have the lowest risk per contact although,
as is clear from the 95% confidence bounds, its estimated per-
contact probability is not significantly different from those of the
other unknown contact categories. We expect that the implemen-
tation of preventive culling within 1 km of an infectious farm
during the epidemic [5] has had a (strong) censoring effect on the
detection of infected farms with 1 km of an infectious farm, thus
producing a downward bias on the transmission probability per
unknown contact within 1 km. We note that the estimated per-
contact probability for the unknown contacts within the distance
band of 1–3 km being higher than that of the 3–10 km distance
band contacts reveals a distance-dependent transmission risk
similar to the one found by Boender et al. [8].
Generally, most exposure-types (all except the crisis organisation
contacts) made a substantial contribution to virus transmission
during the epidemic. We note that the estimated per-contact
probability of virus transmission by the crisis organisation contacts
is 0.0011 and may have caused 0.13% of the infections. We note
that when ignoring all other exposure types, i.e. considering the
crisis organisation contacts alone in a separate analysis, we
estimated a probability of 0.0327 per contact corresponding to
3.92% of the infections. This probability estimate is in agreement
with the estimated maximum probability of virus transmission by a
‘control-person’ per visit of 0.037 reported by te Beest et al. [16]
based also on a separate analysis of crisis organisation contacts
only.
We hypothesize that the lower probability of infection per crisis
organisation contact compared to that of the other-professional
contacts which are almost of the same nature indicates that the
epidemic control teams have better biosecurity than other visitors.
The lower per-contact probability of infection per feed delivery
compared to egg transport may be due to the difference in degree
of contact and the re-use of egg trays. Unlike egg pick-up where
the eggs have to be picked from the egg room, feed delivery may
not involve accessing storage rooms or poultry houses. In most
cases, the feed truck’s delivery tube is directly connected to the
feed storage from the outside thereby reducing the risk of farm
contamination.
In the sensitivity analysis, we find that the majority of the
estimates are robust to the assumed distribution of the most likely
day (among the seven days) of virus introduction. For the few
sensitive (but less contributing) contact types, we concentrate on
the results obtained using the uniform distribution as this assumes
the least prior knowledge on the actual moment of disease
introduction on the farm. Regarding the effect of a possible
difference in tracing efforts on case and non-case farms, we have
The Per-Contact Probability of HPAI Infection
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argued that an under-representation of the contacts to non-case
farms may have at most doubled our probability estimates i.e.,
compared to the ‘ideal’ situation where the tracing efforts are the
same for the case and non-case farms.
The pairwise comparison of the genetic information of the
contact pairs (Tables S1 and S2) shows that the very low numbers
of new infections explained by the traced contacts in our analysis is
consistent with the genetic data. This genetic data has been used to
construct transmission trees in reference [21] and in more detail in
reference [24]. Our present analysis focused on estimating per
contact transmission probabilities for the different between farm
contact types using the contact tracing data. Note that there is no
straight forward way to directly include genetic data in an
estimation of the per contact transmission probabilities as the
sequencing data only gives information on the case farms and not
on the contact farms that escaped infection. However, both data
types (i.e., genetic and epidemiological) can be combined within
the same analysis to, for example, determine transmission
pathways. This approach was proposed by Cottam et al. [25] in
their analysis of part of the 2001 FMD epidemic in UK.
Stegeman and co-workers [18] performed a similar analysis on
the 1997/1998 Classical Swine Fever (CSF) epidemic in the
Netherlands. The common contact types in both studies are the
‘person’ (similar to ‘other-professional’) and rendering contacts.
Perhaps remarkably, the estimated transmission probabilities for
these contacts in our HPAI study are respectively two and four
orders of magnitude higher than those estimated in the CSF study.
These differences are mainly due to a difference in total numbers
of between-farm contacts, with 16 and 12 for the HPAI epidemic
(affecting 255 flocks) compared to 2468 and 10102 for the CSF
epidemic (affecting 429 farms), respectively. The much higher
numbers of contacts in the CSF epidemic are explained in part by
the much longer duration of the epidemic: 15 months in
comparison to the 3 months that the HPAI epidemic lasted. The
difference in number of contacts is likely to be also related in part
to the fact that the CSF epidemic was more spatially extended
compared to the HPAI epidemic. As a result, there were more new
outbreaks occurring outside existing stand-still areas (in which
onward contacts are more restricted) for the CSF epidemic as
compared to the HPAI epidemic.
With our contact inclusion criteria, 44 infected farms have at
least one traced exposure i.e., excluding the ‘unknown’ contacts.
The outbreaks that could not be linked to any known potentially
infectious contact may not only be attributed to the inability to
trace all targeted contacts. Rather, they may serve as a hint about
the presence of other (un-targeted and hence untraced or even
untraceable) mechanisms. This highlights the need to better
understand the possible mechanisms of untraced transmission.
It is important to realize that the probabilities estimated are
conditional on the contact originating from an infectious farm and
do not represent the actual risk of HPAI virus transmission by
these contacts during the epidemic. We also emphasize that care
should be taken when interpreting the per-contact probability
estimate for the rendering contacts due to the possible correlation
between this contact-type and the increased mortality which could
have occurred during the silent spread period of the virus on the
farm i.e., the virus could have already been circulating undetected
on the receiving farms. Nevertheless, the probability estimates
together with the risk-based ranking for the different contacts
obtained in this study can help design better control strategies
against HPAI virus transmission between-farms by these contacts.
All in all, after estimating the per-contact probability of virus
transmission for the different contacts, we conclude that all the
identified contacts made a substantial contribution to the risk of
virus transmission between farms. Therefore, any measures to
reduce on their frequency and to improve biosecurity during all
these contacts are potentially worthwhile. The fact that the
‘unknown’ contacts contributed the most (causing 93.24% of the
infections among themselves) emphasizes the need for a better
understanding of the mechanisms underlying virus transmission.
The findings of this study contribute to the greatly desired
understanding of the mechanisms of indirect transmission of HPAI
virus between farms. Our results suggest that, apart from the
unknown contacts, egg delivery contacts are interesting targets for
improvements in biosecurity due to their high per-contact
probability (31%) in infecting the receiving farms. They further
suggest that the biosecurity applied to the crisis organisation
contacts seems to be adequate at least for preventing the persons
themselves from becoming important fomites between registered
visits. Overall, these findings provide a scientific basis to conduct
further studies, epidemiological or otherwise, to evaluate the
impact of improved biosecurity and minimized contact-frequency
in controlling the between-farm spread of HPAI virus during
epidemics. The knowledge gained in this study can further be
supplemented by research aimed at disentangling the ambiguous
category of ‘unknown’ contacts defined in this study.
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